: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective.
: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure. : Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists. Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by
Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place:
: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success
